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ABSTRACT: Perelman’s discussion about the distinction and relation between the rational and the reason-
able could be seen as an attempt to bring forward a new understanding of rationality. In light of the concep-
tion of situated reason, this paper argues that Perelman’s explication of the dialectic of the rational and the 
reasonable highlights the balance of universality and contexuality, and could contribute a fuller conception 
of rationality to establishing a solid philosophical foundation for Johnson’s informal logic. 
KEYWORDS: argumentation theory, Johnson, informal logic, Perelman, rationality, reasonableness, situ-
ated reason. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In the field of argumentation theory, before McKerrow (1982), Toulmin (2003), van Eeme-
ren and Grootendorst (2004) and other theorists, Chaim Perelman had addressed the distinc-
tion and relation between rationality and reasonableness in his paper “The Rational and The 
Reasonable” (1979a). To my knowledge, few argumentation theoreticians, however, have 
paid attention to or shown interest in Perelman’s discussion, especially how this discussion is 
related to argumentation theory or what its implication for argumentation theory is.  
 The issues I want to address in this paper are what the nature of Perelman’s un-
derstanding of the relation between the rational and the reasonable is, and what, if any, its 
implication for informal logic is. I shall first outline the distinction that Perelman sets 
forth between the rational and the reasonable (Section 2), and then probe into what he 
really understands the relation of the rational and the reasonable (Section 3). After reveal-
ing the philosophical nature of Perelman’s theory in light of the conception of situated 
reason (Section 4), I shall conjecture how Perelman’s theory about the relation between 
the rational and the reasonable could contribute to Johnson’s informal logic (Section 5). 
And finally there is a conclusion (Section 6). 
2. THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE RATIONAL AND THE REASONABLE 
According to Perelman, even though the words of “rational” and “reasonable” both derive 
from the same substantive and connote “a conformity with reason” (Perelman 1979a: 
213), they are rarely interchangeable. Thus, one would call a deduction which conforms 
to the rule of logic rational, but not necessarily reasonable. A compromise, however, may 
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be called reasonable but not rational. Perelman analyzes Godwin’s famous argument that 
there is no rationality in loving one’s own father more than other men unless it is possible 
to prove that one’s father is better human being than these other men. It seems to him that 
Godwin’s thinking may be logical and rational, but who would call it reasonable? This 
example and many others like it indicate that “the idea of reason is shown in at least two 
diametrically opposed ways” (Perelman 1979a: 213). That is to say, the terms “rational” 
and “reasonable”, or “rationality” and “reasonableness”, according to Perelman, refer to 
two different ways of conceptualizing reason. 
 Perelman accounts for this difference by distinguishing the rational and the rea-
sonable in terms of their favoured epistemic values and corresponding methods. Concern-
ing the rational aspect of human thought processes, he writes: 
From a traditional point of view, philosophical discourse is discourse addressed to reason, the 
latter being considered a faculty illuminated by divine reason or at least modeled on it – a 
non-temporal and invariable faculty, common to all rational beings, and constituting the spe-
cific characteristic of all members of the human race. (Perelman 1979b: 47) 
It means that traditional philosophy aims for universal, abstract truths which are appre-
hensible to all those that possess this faculty. In such philosophical discourse, “the ra-
tional corresponds to mathematical reason; for some it is a reflection of divine reason, 
which grasps necessary relations, which knows a priori certain self-evident and immuta-
ble truths.” (Perelman 1979a: 213. Italics original) The truths discovered by the rational 
are universal since the rational imposes its outlook on all reasoning beings and “owes 
nothing to experience, or to dialogue, and depends neither on education, nor on the cul-
ture of a milieu or an epoch” (Perelman 1979a: 213). It is not difficult to see that univer-
sality, necessity and self-evidence constitute the epistemic values that the rational favours. 
 As a consequence of preferring universality, necessity and self-evidence, the 
rational endorses the methods of demonstration in theoretical domains. In other words, 
the rational itself is exemplified by demonstration. Perelman points out: 
In its contemporary form, demonstration is a calculation made in accordance with rules that 
have been laid down beforehand. No recourse is allowed to evidence or to any intuition other 
than that of the senses. The only requirement is the ability to distinguish signs and to perform 
operations according to rules. A demonstration is regarded as correct or incorrect according as it 
conforms, or fails to conform, to the rules. A conclusion is held to be demonstrated if it can be 
reached by means of a series of correct operations starting from premises accepted as axioms. 
Whether these axioms be considered as evident, necessary, true or hypothetical, the relation be-
tween them and the demonstrated theorems remains unchanged. To pass from a correct infer-
ence to the truth or to the computable probability of the conclusion, one must admit both the 
truth of the premises and the coherence of the axiomatic system. (Perelman 1979b: 10) 
Since the second half of the 19
th
 century modern formal logic has become the study of the 
methods of demonstration through analyzing the methods of proof used by mathemati-
cians (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969: 10). To some extent modern formal logic 
embodies the character of the rational. From the viewpoint of modern formal logic, an 
argument should be detached not only from the surrounding verbal discourse but also 
from the social and psychological contexts in which that discourse occurs. The validity of 
an argument is decided by rules of inference or logical forms. Once accepting the rules of 
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inference and argument forms that are valid for a system of formal logic, it is possible for 
any inquirer to see the necessity in the link from the premises to the conclusion.  
 The reasonable aspect, on the other hand, embraces another set of epistemic val-
ues and the related method. According to Perelman, the reasonable, in both judgment and 
behavior, corresponds to “common sense”. A reasonable man makes his decisions and 
judges his actions not so much by self-evident truths and logical coherence with abstract 
principles, but rather by acceptability. The guide for decisions and behavior in all practi-
cal domains is what is acceptable in his own milieu, and if possible, what should be ac-
cepted by all in analogous circumstances. However, this thrust toward generalization or 
universalization which is characteristic of the reasonable is by no means the universality 
or immutability favoured by the rational. Since what is considered to be reasonable is 
limited to time, place, circumstance and community, reasonable decisions and behavior, 
even related to similar issues, will vary with different ages and different social settings. 
This is why Perelman emphasizes that “the reasonable of one age is not the reasonable of 
another, it can vary like common sense” (Perelman 1979a: 215). Closely related to the 
epistemic values of acceptability and contexuality, the reasonable also differs from the 
rational in its flexibility or its preferring changeability to necessity. “The reasonable of 
today is not the reasonable of yesterday, but is more often an effort toward more coher-
ence, toward more clarity, toward a more systematized view of things which is at the base 
of change” (Perelman 1979a: 215). 
 In contrast to demonstration used in the realm of the rational, the method associ-
ated with the reasonable is argumentation. “To reason,” Perelman maintains, “is not 
merely to verify and to demonstrate, but also to deliberate, to criticize, and to justify, to 
give reasons for and against—in a word, to argue” (Perelman 1980: 59). Given that what 
is reasonable is changeable, and cannot be determined independently of context, if we 
must choose between opinions, if the object of our inquiry is not self-evidently true, we 
will obviously be out of the realm of the rational, where the methods of demonstration 
have no place. For Perelman, the reasonable is sensitive to the history, tradition, and cul-
ture of a community; it is not the domain of self-evident truths, but of acceptability: “the 
very nature of deliberation and argumentation is opposed to necessity and self-evidence, 
since no one deliberates or argues against what is self-evident” (Perelman and Olbrechts-
Tyteca 1969: 1). Put another way, “the domain of argumentation is that of the credible, 
the plausible, the probable to the degree that the latter eludes the certainty of calcula-
tions” (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969: 1). 
 To sum up, it seems to Perelman that the opposing terms “rational” and “reason-
able” not only refer to two different aspects of human thought processes, but also show 
two different ways of conceptualizing reason. Rationality conceived in traditional philos-
ophy manifests itself in the pursuit of universality, necessity and self-evident truth, and 
endorses the methods of demonstration that are mainly studied by modern formal logic. 
Reasonableness, on the other hand, expresses its epistemic preference in contexuality, 




3. THE RELATION BETWEEN THE RATIONAL AND THE REASONABLE 
Since the rational contrasts with the reasonable in their favoured epistemic values and 
corresponding methods, according to Perelman, there is a continuing tension between the 
rational and the reasonable in any system of human thought in which neither should be 
considered nor allowed to be dominant. For example, if the reasonableness of common 
sense and public opinion were supreme, any advance in thought based on logical adherence 
to philosophical or scientific principles but departing from the common sense of one’s time 
and one’s society would be excluded. On the other hand, it is frequently only an appeal to 
common sense that can guide us to a choice between opposing philosophical systems.  
 Even though the rational and the reasonable function as two opposing aspects of 
human thought processes, Perelman does not think they are separate entities. With respect 
to the interaction or relation between the rational and the reasonable, he points out that “it 
is the dialectic of the rational and the reasonable, the confrontation of logical coherence 
with the unreasonable character of conclusions, which is at the base of the progress of 
thought” (Perelman 1979a: 215). After this observation Perelman provides a case study of 
law made to examine how this confrontation or this dialectic shows itself. 
 At one time, according to Perelman, the rational element in law was considered a 
function of natural law. Human law was considered rational in so far as it corresponded 
to the universal and immutable principles of natural law established by God. He quotes 
from Domat, the best known French legal writer in the 18
th
 century, to say that “these 
laws present immutable justice, the same everywhere and always; whether written or un-
written, no human authority can abolish or change them” (Perelman 1979a: 216). In con-
temporary times the notion of positive law corresponding to the divine natural order, 
however, has receded in the field of legal philosophy. The principles upon which the ra-
tional element in law is based are now sought in the legislature rather than in the mind of 
God, and unlike natural law, they are not regarded as universal and immutable any longer. 
We assume a priori that legislators are familiar with the legal and social systems in which 
their new laws will be incorporated, that they understand the meanings of the laws they 
make, and that they are committed to preserving the coherence of the legal and social 
systems. The courts’ function then is to deduce the logical application of the generalized 
norms in law to specific situations. 
 The element of reasonableness plays a completely different role in law. For one 
thing, it establishes a framework or the outer limits within which the legal system must 
operate. It is always presumed that legal authority will be exercised reasonably. An act or 
decision that is unreasonable is always unacceptable in law. Furthermore, since “the ex-
istence of this framework makes it impossible to reduce the legal system to a formal and 
positivistic concept” (Perelman 1979a: 216), the reasonable aspect of law also determines 
the context of the particular decision, its effect on the community and its acceptance by 
the community as fair and unbiased. Perelman concludes the description of the different 
functions of the rational and the reasonable in law as follows: 
The rational in law corresponds to adherence to an immutable divine standard, or to the spirit 
of the system, to logic and coherence, to conformity with precedents, to purposefulness. 
Where the reasonable, on the other hand, characterizes the decision itself, the fact that it is 
acceptable or not by public opinion, that its consequences are socially useful or harmful, that 
it is felt to be equitable or biased. (Perelman 1979a: 217; italics in original) 
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 It seems to Perelman that the rational and the reasonable represent two essential 
and dynamically complimentary aspects of law. Both are necessary for a healthy legal 
system. The rational element makes human interaction more consistent, more ordered, 
more predictable. On the other hand, the rationality of law, untouched and untethered by 
reasonableness, would be monstrous. Only the reasonable aspect of law keeps it humane. 
Perelman holds that “when the rational and the reasonable mutually support each other, 
when reasoning according to principles ends in a satisfying decision, there is no problem” 
(Perelman 1979a: 217). This is to say, if the rational and the reasonable elements of law 
coincide, if reasoning on the basis of legal principles and precedents produces decisions 
that are seen as fair and socially acceptable, the legal system is working smoothly. Clear-
ly this could be said to be in a state of high equilibrium.  
 However, “when the fidelity to the spirit of a system leads to an unacceptable, 
biased or socially inadmissible conclusion, in a word, to an unreasonable conclusion, this 
leads to the indispensability of a reconsideration of the system” (Perelman 1979a: 217). 
Furthermore, the rational element in law—precise principles and logical deduction from 
these principles—cannot provide a clear basis for decision in every situation. This means 
that “the idea of the reasonable intervenes in law in the absence of a theory which would 
furnish more precise criteria for the basis of a decision” (Perelman 1979a: 218). For exam-
ple, what is the compensation which the victim has a right to from another’s faulty action? 
What are the consequences that can be reasonably imputed to this action? All theories elab-
orated in this regard seem to be unsatisfactory. When dealing with complex situations, ac-
cording to Perelman, judges very often refer to what is reasonable, to justify their decisions 
without being able to formulate a precise rule which would be applicable in all cases of this 
kind. On the other hand, the reasonable decision may offer only a provisional solution, so 
its more profound effect may be a re-examination and reordering of legal principles, an 
alteration of the legal system, that allow for a rational, and systematic solution to this and 
similar problems. Unlike the cases where the rational and the reasonable elements function 
smoothly, the dialectic between the rational and the reasonable, the confrontation of logical 
coherence with the unreasonable solutions, indicates a state of disequilibrium. For Perel-
man, this disequilibrium, this confrontation, this dialectic is still highly significant since it 
constitutes a basis for the improvement of law, more generally, movement of thought. 
4. PERELMAN’S THEORY AND THE CONCEPTION OF SITUATED REASON 
In fact, most standard English-language dictionaries such as Oxford English Dictionary 
do not support the distinction between the words “rational” and “reasonable” made by 
Perelman and seem to treat the two terms as virtually interchangeable. In response to a 
question along this line at the 1977 Ottawa Symposium where Perelman delivered his 
paper, he tacitly accepted this criticism. His response was that he was not a linguist, nor a 
grammarian, and had no interest in language as such. For Perelman, words are symbols 
which can take upon themselves whatever meanings their user wants them to have. “Lan-
guage is a tool, I use it as suggestive, and I begin by that and see how we could use it and 
adapt it to all philosophical, legal and other needs” (Perelman 1979a: 222). 
 I am neither an expert in linguistics nor an expert in law, so I shall not go into 
detail about the inconsistency between the meanings which Perelman attaches to “ration-
al” and “reasonable” and the meanings given in English-language dictionaries, or his ac-
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count of how the dialectic of the rational and the reasonable show itself in law. Since Pe-
relman claims we can adapt language to all needs, especially in philosophical disciplines, 
what I want to do in this section is to conjecture the philosophical nature of his theory 
about the relation between the rational and the reasonable. 
 To my mind, Perelman’s distinction between the rational and the reasonable 
aspect of human thought processes could be traced back to Aristotle’s analysis of the 
structure of the rational part of the soul, even though I have no textual evidence. As men-
tioned above, both what Perelman calls the rational and the reasonable conform to reason; 
analogously, Aristotle also asserts that the rational part of the soul has two parts: 
one by which we contemplate the kind of things whose principles cannot be otherwise, and 
one by which we contemplate variable things…Let one of these parts be called the scientific 
and the other calculative. (Aristotle 1991, Nichomachean Ethics, 1139a5-12) 
The scientific part of the soul deals with invariable things, the result of which is episteme 
(theoretical knowledge or scientific knowledge). Phronesis (practical wisdom, practical 
knowledge or prudence), in contrast, is the function of the calculative part of the soul, 
taking variable things, namely, human action, as its object.  
 According to Aristotle’s theory of knowledge, the scientific and calculative parts 
also differ from each other in their favoured epistemic values. The former strives for nec-
essary, universal truth for its own sake, favours the method of demonstration, prefers ex-
actness, and shows no interest in its application to practical things. On the other hand, the 
latter is concerned with what is indeterminate and contingent, inclined towards a broad 
outline of truth, endorses the method of deliberation, prefers the mediation between the 
universal and the particular, and places an emphasis on its application to human life. 
 Focusing on favoured epistemic values, it is easy to see the analogy between 
what Perelman call the rational and the reasonable and what Aristotle call the scientific 
and the calculative part of the soul. In fact, this kind of relation can also be found when 
Perelman claims that “the idea of the reasonable in law corresponds to an equitable solu-
tion” (Perelman 1979a: 218), because Aristotle also views equity as related to the func-
tion of the calculative part of the soul. For me, it is these observations that supply us with 
a valuable clue to exploring the philosophical nature of Perelman’s theory about the rela-
tion between the rational and the reasonable. 
 According to Aristotle, in practical life the calculative part of the soul needs to 
know not only the general principles, rules and norms, but also how to apply them in par-
ticular situations. It is in the mediation between the universal and the particular that 
phronesis is required.  
Nor is practical wisdom concerned with universals only—it must also recognize the particu-
lars; for it is practical, and practice is concerned with particulars … Now practical wisdom is 
concerned with action; therefore one should have both forms of it, or the latter in preference 
to the former.
 
(Aristotle 1991, Nichomachean Ethics, 1141b14-22) 
Here Aristotle characterizes the function of the calculative part of the soul and its result in 
terms of the relation of the universal and the particular. 
 Phronesis is essentially deliberative than demonstrative and deliberation is cal-
culative in nature. “To deliberate and to calculate are the same thing, but no one deliber-
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ates about what cannot be otherwise” (Aristotle 1991, Nichomachean Ethics, 1139a12-
14). Aristotle points out:  
Deliberation is not concerned with those branches of knowledge that have precise rules of 
their own; e.g. writing, for we do not hesitate over the way in which a word should be written. 
The effects about which we deliberate are those which are produced by our agency but not 
always in the same way; e.g. the practice of medicine and of finance, and of navigation—
which calls for more deliberation than physical training does, inasmuch as it has not been re-




Although Aristotle here refers to various forms of art, the point also applies to human 
actions in practical life. If an action in ethical, political life can be specified by a set of 
precise rules, there is no need for deliberation. We can accomplish it by mechanically 
following the rules. But under many circumstances, actions in practical life cannot be 
reduced to a system of precise rules. This brings indeterminacy or uncertainty into our 
actions. It is exactly those particular circumstances that give rise to the indeterminacy of 
actions. This makes deliberation necessary. Thus, deliberation not only relates to what is 
universal, but also to what is particular. It is in this sense that Aristotle claims “Error in 
deliberation may be either about the universal or about the particular”  (Aristotle 1991, 
Nichomachean Ethics, 1142a22). 
 As a corollary of what has been said, Aristotle claims that equity is superior to 
legal justice. Law is universal, but human actions take place in particular situations. 
Therefore, there are always some circumstances that cannot be covered by a universal 
legal principle. On such occasions, the law needs the correction of equity. Aristotle says: 
When the law states a general rule, and a case arises under this that is exceptional, then it is 
right, where the legislator owing to the generality of his language has erred in not covering 
that case, to correct the omission by a ruling such as the legislator himself would have given 
if he had been present there, and as he would have enacted if he had been aware of the cir-
cumstances. (Aristotle 1955,  Nichomachean Ethics, 1137b20-24)  
It is in correcting the deficiencies resulting from the generality or universality of law that 
the legislator displays equity. Therefore, Aristotle holds that equity is the rectification of 
legal justice. The reason that the legislator can correct the deficiencies of legal justice is 
that he is “present” and understands the circumstances, in other words, he has the 
knowledge of the particular. Equity is superior to legal justice in that it knows not only 
the universal, but also the particular. 
 Along the same line of thought, Perelman also relates the reasonable element in 
law to equity. This point is clearly expressed in that “the idea of the reasonable in law 
corresponds to an equitable solution, in the absence of all precise rules of adjudication” 
(Perelman, 1979a: 218). Perelman points out: 
  
                                                 
1
 In this section I mainly quote W. D. Ross’s translation of Aristotle’s The Nichomachean Ethics in The 
Complete Works of Aristotle edited by Jonathan Barnes. However, on some occasions, I use Thomson’s 
translation when I find that it fits in better with the theme of this section. 
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There are exceptional situations where we have to provide for a solution that would be equi-
table, and the Law itself does not provide for such a solution. There the equitable is not 
something that could be very precisely formulated, and in this sense, the equitable seems to 
be the reasonable. (Perelman 1979a: 220) 
No matter how rational, e.g. precise and universal, legal principles are, they cannot be 
applicable to all particular situations. That is to say, there are always some exceptions to 
the universal rules of law. Under those circumstances, when trying to make a reasonable 
or acceptable solution, judges should use their discretionary power cautiously and focus 
more attention on the particularity of those situations, the individual and social effects of 
that particular solution, than the logical coherence of the legal system. Only by virtues of 
this dialectic of the rational and the reasonable can an equitable, accordingly, a reasona-
ble solution be produced. 
 Philosophically, it is plain to see that the mediation between the universal and 
the particular forms the central point of Aristotle and Perelman’s discourse on equity in 
law. With regard to the relation of the rational and the reasonable elements in law, the 
state of equilibrium between the rational and the reasonable exemplifies well the media-
tion of the universal and the particular. As mentioned above, if the rational and the rea-
sonable mutually support each other, that is to say, reasoning on the basis of universal 
legal principles and precedents produces reasonable decisions that are fair and socially 
acceptable; the legal system is working smoothly. Even in the state of disequilibrium, the 
dialectic of the rational and the reasonable also involves this kind of mediation. Under 
some circumstances which universal legal principles cannot cover, although the reasona-
ble decision may offer only a temporary, particular solution, it may lead to a re-
examination and reordering of universal principles, even an alteration of the legal system. 
“The reasonable guides this endeavor toward systematization, toward the rational system-
atic solution” (Perelman 1979a: 219). Eventually a new mediation between the universal 
and the particular will emerge. Based upon the above analysis, I want to argue that the 
philosophical nature of Perelman’s theory about the relation of the rational and the rea-
sonable is to highlight the significance of the mediation between universality and particu-
larity (or contexuality).  
 The rational and the reasonable are different aspects of how human thought pro-
cesses exhibit “a conformity with reason.” In Perelman’s terminology, the rational is as-
sociated with universality, necessity and self-evidence; this means it is devoid of passion, 
detached from considerations of circumstance, time and place. Thus, the rational man is a 
one-side being, functioning like a machine. Accordingly, the conception of reason that 
underlies the rational is “mathematical reason” or “divine reason” which separates itself 
from other faculties of human beings. The reasonable, on the other hand, “addresses itself 
to the whole man, and not an abstract faculty, ‘the reason’, opposed to the will and the 
emotion” (Perelman 1984: 194). It is inclined towards acceptability and changeability, 
sensitive to the history, tradition, and culture of a community. Therefore, the conception 
of reason upon which the reasonable is based is no doubt a more flexible, enlarged and 
fuller one. The relation of the rational and the reasonable that demonstrates the mediation 
between universality and contexuality is still in accordance with reason; but what does 
Perelman mean by the word “reason” here? To my mind, Putnam and Habermas’s discus-
sion of the conception of reason is particularly useful in this regard. 
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 For Putnam, reason is “both immanent (not to be found outside of concrete lan-
guage games and institutions) and transcendent (a regulative idea that we use to criticize 
the conduct of all activities and institutions)” (Putnam 1982: 8). If a philosopher loses 
sight of the immanence of reason, that is, fails to take account of the fact that reason is 
always relative to context and institution, he will become lost in characteristic philosoph-
ical fantasies such as positivism; if he loses sight of the transcendence of reason, he will 
become a cultural relativist. When Habermas in Post-metaphysical Thinking discusses the 
conception of reason in the era of post-metaphysical thinking, he refers to the above quo-
tation by Putman and puts it into his own words as follows: 
The validity claimed for propositions and norms transcends spaces and times, but in each ac-
tual case the claim is raised here and now, in a specific context, and accepted or rejected with 
real implications for social interaction. (Habermas 1992: 139) 
According to Habermas, post-metaphysical philosophical movements in the 20
th
 century 
have cast doubt on the idea that reason should be conceived abstractly beyond history and 
the complexities of social life, and have contextualized or situated reason in actual histor-
ical practices. Unlike the idealistic concept of reason that prefers what is universal, su-
pratemporal, and necessary to what is particular, variable, and accidental, the conception 
of situated reason tries to keep balance between the immanence (or context-dependence) 
and transcendence of reason at the same time.
1
 
 Clearly, the conception of reason that underpins the relation of the rational and 
the reasonable, or the mediation between universality and contexuality, is exactly what 
Habermas calls situated reason. For Perelman, both the rational and the reasonable as-
pects of law are necessary for a healthy legal system. If a legal system only focuses on 
universal principles and does not take account of contextual concerns, it cannot function 
smoothly, since no universal principle can be equally applied to all particular situations. 
On the other hand, if a legal system only pay attention to contextual concerns and lose 
sight of the existence of universal principles, it will collapse sooner or later, since its uni-
versal constraining force and logical coherence are not highly regarded. So, it is the dia-
lectic of the rational and the reasonable, the mediation or balance between the universal 
and contextual factors that guarantees the healthy functioning of a legal system. 
5. A FULLER CONCEPTION OF RATIONALITY AND JOHNSON’S INFORMAL LOGIC 
In light of Habermas’s conception of situated reason, I argue that Perelman’s effort to bal-
ance the rational and the reasonable can provide us with a fuller conception of rationality.  
 Perelman’s characterization of the rational is closely related to what Harold I. 
Brown calls the “classical model” of rationality. According to this model, for a belief, deci-
sion, action, etc. to be rational, it must be universal in that a given body of evidence will 
render it rational or not universally; necessary in that it must follow necessarily from the 
relevant body of reasons/evidence; and must be a matter of rules in that it must both con-
                                                 
1
 Analogous to Habermas’s critique of the idealistic concept of reason, Wittgenstein describes the prima-
cy of the universal over the particular, a dominant view in the Western intellectual tradition, or perhaps 
more accurately, the continental European tradition, as “the craving for the generality” and “the con-
temptuous attitude towards the particular case” (Wittgenstein 1969: 18). 
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form to and be based on appropriate rules (Brown 1988: 5-19). Clearly, these three neces-
sary conditions on rationality more or less exemplify the epistemic values, such as univer-
sality and necessity, endorsed by the rational. On the other hand, Perelman’s fuller concep-
tion of rationality not only includes the reasonable as rational, that is to say, integrates con-
textual and historical considerations, the methods of deliberation and argumentation, the 
criterion of acceptability and so on into the function of rationality, but also attaches great 
significance to the balance between the universal factors and the contextual concerns.  
 Of course, there are various approaches to rationality. Or to put it another way, 
rationality manifests itself in multiple dimensions, for example, intrinsic and instrumental 
rationality, theoretical and practical rationality, monological and communicative rationality, 
bounded and unbounded rationality. The approach Perelman takes to outline his fuller con-
ception of rationality is the relation between universality and contexuality. In my view, this 
conception of rationality has rich implications in the field of argumentation theory as well 
as the field of law and many other fields. In this section I do not want to analyze and exam-
ine how this conception of rationality manifests itself in Perelman’s new rhetoric, but to 
venture how it could contribute to informal logic, especially Johnson’s theory of argument. 
 As is known to many, the concept of rationality plays an essential role in John-
son’s informal logic. This can be seen from the title of his monograph on informal logic 
“Manifest Rationality”. According to him, “the central thesis of this book is to properly 
understand the practice of argumentation; we must view it as an exercise in manifest ra-
tionality” (Johnson 2000: 144). In the preamble to his explication of manifest rationality, 
Johnson discusses five aspects of the connection between argumentation and rationality. 
First, argumentation embraces rationality. This is to say, argumentation requires “that 
nothing be accepted but what is shown to have reason behind it” (ibid.: 162). Second, 
argumentation depends on mutual rationality. It means that argumentation requires a 
partner who is also rational. Third, argumentation increases rationality. Engaging in ar-
gumentation leads participants to be better arguers and become more rational. Fourth, 
argumentation exhibits rationality by virtue of public performance of arguing. And last, 
rationality is the glue that binds argumentation and rhetoric. The rhetor is rational since he 
makes use of reasons to support his position. However, “what separates rhetoric from ar-
gumentation is that the latter is bound by the requirement of manifest rationality” (ibid.: 
163). 
 With regard to manifest rationality, Johnson claims, “To say that the practice of 
argumentation is characterized by manifest rationality is to say that it is patently and 
openly rational” to all participants (ibid.: 163). All of them agree to accept nothing that is 
not supported by reasons. Furthermore, “Manifest rationality is why the arguer is obligat-
ed to respond to objections and criticisms from others and not ignore them or sweep them 
under the carpet” (ibid.: 164). To not answer to objections and criticisms “would not only 
not be rational; it would not look rational” (ibid.: 164). 
5.1 Johnson’s specification of rationality 
It is now time to raise some questions concerning the concept of rationality that underlies 
Johnson’s explication of the connection of argumentation and rationality. First, what does 
he mean by rationality? Johnson is aware of the multiplicity of approaches to rationality, 
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but content to follow H. Siegel’s reflections on rationality. Considering that the mean-end 
approach to rationality has some important limitations, Siegel writes: 
At a minimum, then, we need a better account of rationality than the means-end account if we 
are to further our understanding of rationality, and of the many philosophical problems which 
center on that notion. We need an account of rationality which recognizes various sorts of 
reasons and which provides in sight into the nature and epistemic force of reasons, and which 
affords the possibility of the rational scrutiny of ends. (Siegel 1988: 131) 
Johnson agrees with Siegel, and further defines rationality as “the ability to engage in the 
practice of giving and receiving reasons” (Johnson 2000: 14). Accordingly, to be rational 
means to be able to engage in the giving and receiving of reasons. In another place, this 
specification of rationality is also articulated as “the disposition to, and the action of, us-
ing, giving, and-or acting on the basis of reasons” (ibid.: 161). 
5.2 The meanings of the multiple occurrences of  
“rational” and “rationality” in Johnson’s theory of argument 
Since Johnson has his own understanding of the nature of rationality, another question aris-
es naturally—do the multiple occurrences of the words “rational” and “rationality” in John-
son’s Manifest Rationality share the same meaning as given by his own definition of ra-
tionality? I think it might be helpful to check, though very briefly, what Johnson talks about 
as the basic features of argumentation and the connection of argumentation and rationality. 
 The first feature of argumentation is that it is teleological in the sense that its 
fundamental purpose is rational persuasion. By rational persuasion Johnson means that 
“the arguer wishes to persuade the Other to accept the conclusion on the basis of the rea-
sons and considerations cited, and those alone” (ibid.: 150). Clearly what he means here 
by rational fits well with his specification of rationality. 
 The second feature of argumentation is that it is dialectical. “An exchange is 
dialectical when, as a result of the intervention of the Other, one’s own logos (discourse, 
reasoning, or thinking) has the potential of being affected in some way” (ibid.: 161). To 
my mind, whether or not the arguer’s own logos would be influenced by the Other de-
pends partly on the strength of objections, criticism and opposing points of view raised by 
the Other, partly on what kind of attitude the arguer takes to the intervention of the Other. 
There is no question that the former factor presupposes Johnson’s specification of ration-
ality, but it is not clear enough to me how the latter fits with his concept of rationality, since 
the attitude to the intervention of the Other is concerned with the norms for successful 
communication, and these norms cannot be reduced to “the giving and receiving reasons”. 
 Concerning manifest rationality as the final feature of argumentation, Johnson 
discusses the connection between argumentation and rationality from five aspects. In my 
view, when he argues that argumentation embraces, increases and exhibits rationality, it 
is fair to say that he sticks to his own definition of rationality; in contrast, the remaining 
two aspects appear to be a bit complicated. According to Johnson, argumentation depends 
on mutual rationality in the sense that it requires a partner who is also rational. It seems to 
my mind that rationality in this case does not merely mean the ability to engage in the 
practice of giving and receiving reasons, but also requires being in accordance with some 
fundamental principles of human interaction. The point is uncovered by the word “mutual”. 
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 Johnson also claims that rationality cannot distinguish between argumentation 
and rhetoric since the rhetor must also use reasons in a speech act situation. Here the 
meaning he attaches to the word “rationality” is just his own specification of rationality. 
However, things becomes very perplexing when he points out that the rhetor may ignore 
objections to his argument “if ignoring the objection will lead to a more effective com-
munication, and if doing so is rational” (ibid.: 163). In this quotation the meaning of the 
word “rational” seems different from Johnson’s definition of rationality, and to have a 
variant sense which is similar to what instrumental rationality refers to, namely that a 
means is rational if it is efficient or effective in achieving a specific end. According to 
Johnson, the fundamental purpose of argumentation is rational persuasion. This means 
argumentation should be treated as a rational means of persuasion. This treatment shows 
clearly that there actually is a role that the instrumental rationality can play in theorizing 
argumentation, but Johnson seldom talks about the instrumental theory of rationality ex-
cept pointing out its inadequacy for his purposes.  
 It is not difficult to see that the meanings of “rational” and “rationality” which 
Johnson uses to elucidate the connection between argumentation and rationality are not 
limited to his own definition of rationality. He uses the words implicitly in more than one 
meaning. Even though “rationality” in his explication is indeed mainly used to refer to the 
ability or disposition to giving and receiving reasons, it is sometimes used in a sense 
similar to intrinsic rationality—rationality that is and appears to be used for its own sake, 
i.e. “manifest rationality”. Occasionally it means instrumental rationality—rationality 
used to achieve some extrinsic end—which Johnson implicitly assigns to the rhetor.  
5.3 Why is it rational to respond to objections, criticisms  
and alternative positions when constructing an argument? 
Another problem concerning the function of rationality in the formation of Johnson’s theo-
ry of argument is that of how to get a better justification for the inclusion of the dialectical 
tier as an essential component of an argument (at least the paradigm case of argument).  
 Why does argumentation need dealing with objections, criticisms and alternative 
positions to be rational? Quite a few commentators have pointed out that Johnson’s un-
derstanding of rationality is inadequate to provide a good justification for the necessity of 
dealing with dialectical materials when constructing an argument. For me, this necessity 
does not simply lie in that argumentation should be based on the giving and receiving 
reasons, but that argumentation requires the arguer’s logos be influenced by the logos of 
the Other. As addressed above, what kind of attitude the arguer takes to the intervention 
of the Other plays a crucial role in resolving the issue of whether or not the arguer’s own 
logos would be affected by the Other. To judge whether the arguer’s attitude is appropri-
ate or not, in my view, must presuppose some fundamental norms for successful commu-
nication. At this point, it would be best to introduce another kind of rationality, i.e. com-
municative rationality, to justify why argumentation need display its rationality by re-
sponding to objections, criticisms and alternative positions.  
 In my view, the necessity of the inclusion of the dialectical tier as a component 
of an argument is one thing; whether or not Johnson’s definition of rationality can justify 
this necessity is another thing. Johnson’s conception of rationality fails evidently to sup-
ply a good justification, and this means either we change the foundation of the justifica-
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tion, or else we develop a richer conception of rationality to account for the criteria for 
the dialectical adequacy of an argument as well as the inclusion of the dialectical tier be a 
component of an argument.  
5.4 An implicit understanding of rationality in Johnson’s theory of argument 
In fact, there is also another conception of rationality in Johnson’s informal logic, but he fails 
to make it explicit in his own specification of rationality. That is the conception of rationality 
articulated by Perelman, laying emphasis on the balance between universality and contexuality.  
 When talking about the characteristics of the informal logic approach to argu-
ment, Johnson maintains: 
One of the merits, I believe, of the informal logic approach to argument has been its position-
ing of itself between the (excessively) abstract universalist approach taken in FDL (a theory 
where one size fits all), and the more contextualized and nuanced approaches found in rheto-
ric and speech communication—which are highly context sensitive. (Johnson 2006: 251) 
In his account, the formal logic approach to argument analysis and appraisal shows a ten-
dency to develop a theory where one size fits all, and the approach to argument found in 
rhetoric and speech communication is highly context-sensitive. Though the attempt to 
strike a balance between what is universal and what is contextualized is something of a 
tightrope act, an adequate theory of argument definitely needs this kind of balance. Thus, 
on the one hand, informal logic should retain some of the universalist tendencies of formal 
logic, and aim to give an account of argument that is applicable across the board; on the other 
hand, it is also more open to the need to pay attention to the details provided by context. 
 Even though Johnson sees informal logic as positioned between formal logic and 
rhetoric, or universalist and contextualized approaches to argument, accordingly, endors-
es implicitly the conception of rationality that focuses on the balance between universali-
ty and contexuality, how does this balance manifest itself in Johnson’s own conceptual-
ization of argument? How is it concretized into the definition of argument, the theory of 
analysis, the theory of evaluation and the theory of criticism? These issues are still very 
much up in the air.
 1
 
 Johnson acknowledges that “the issue here is how to understand rationality for 
the purpose at hand—which is to show the contribution that informal logic can make to 
the development of a better theory of argumentation” (ibid.: 13). But he admittedly by-
passes the intriguing theoretical issues concerning the nature of rationality and its multi-
ple manifestations. The actual usage of “rational” and “rationality” in his theory, as re-
vealed above, is inconsistent with his own specification of rationality. This deficiency has 
already created some negative impacts on the theory-formation of his informal logic.  
                                                 
1
 Walton seems be aware of the importance of the balance between universality and contexuality in the 
theory-formation. He claims, “The new dialectic is a framework for reasoning that strikes a healthy bal-
ance between descriptive empirical research on argumentation and normative or abstract logical meth-
ods of setting standards for good arguments. Such a balance, although lacking in the past, is healthy be-
cause neither the empirical nor the normative approach, by itself, can provide a method of argument 
evaluation that is both objective in standards and that fits the realities of real cases of argumentation in a 
way that is practically useful.” (Walton 1999: 89-90) 
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 When advancing his own theory of argumentation, Johnson addresses the question 
“What are the adequacy conditions that a theory of argument must meet?” According to him: 
A complete theory of argument would consist of a theory of analysis, a theory of appraisal, 
and a bridge between the two theories—showing how the theory of analysis leads into or 
supports the theory of appraisal. (Johnson 2000: 52) 
With this lead, he works out a set of adequacy conditions for a theory of argument. For 
example, the theory must contain a definition of argument and the elements that constitute 
an argument; an account of how to understand the structure of arguments and how that 
structure may be displayed in a clear and precise manner; a theory of appraisal that recog-
nizes that there can be good arguments for a given position as well as good arguments 
against it. Even though Johnson realizes the crucial importance of the conception of ration-
ality for informal logic developing into a better theory of argumentation, there is actually 
no an adequacy condition aimed at the conception of rationality, i.e. a theory of argument 
must contain an account of rationality that can provide a comprehensive and sufficient jus-
tification for the theory of analysis, the theory of appraisal and the bridge between the both. 
 Given that the conception of rationality is essential for the shaping of informal 
logic and that Johnson’s understanding of rationality is inadequate to supply a compre-
hensive and sufficient justification for his own theory, it seems to me the future develop-
ment of Johnson’s theory of argument is in urgent need of a fuller conception of rationali-
ty which should include Perelman’s conception of the balance between universality and 
contexuality as a constituent. 
6. CONCLUSION 
I have outlined Perelman’s distinction between the rational and reasonable in terms of their 
favoured epistemic values and corresponding methods, and argued that the differences be-
tween the rational and the reasonable do not make both aspects of human thought processes 
to be separate entities. Moreover, In light of conception of situated reason, I have argued 
that Perelman’s explication of the dialectic of the rational and the reasonable highlights the 
balance between universality and contexuality, and suggests a fuller conception of ration-
ality than that one conceived of by traditional philosophy. Based upon these observations, I 
have taken my discussion a step further and revealed the limitations of Johnson’s specifica-
tion of rationality and their negative effects on the shaping of his own theory of argument.  
 To my mind, the reason why Johnson’s informal logic is in urgent need of a 
fuller conception of rationality is to a great extent that it lacks a philosophical constituent 
that is similar to what the Dutch pragma-dialecticians call “the philosophical estate of the 
realm of argumentation studies” (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 2004: 11). With regard 
to the importance of philosophical reflection in argumentation studies, van Eemeren and 
Grootendorst hold: 
 “Fundamental” philosophical reflection is essential because the crucial issues of the disci-
pline are at stake. No consistent scientific practices are possible without well-conceived phil-
osophical principles. Those principles directly affect the nature of theory-formation. They are 
expressed not only in the selection of the themes that are in need of theorizing, but also in the 
way in which the research is undertaken and how the research findings are used in practice. 
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This is why it is important that argumentation theory be practiced from a perspective that is 
philosophically justifiable. (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 2004: 13) 
I do not want to address whether the philosophical reflections of the Dutch pragma-dialectics 
are successful. What I really want to say is that their observations quoted above are undoubt-
edly applicable to Johnson’s version of informal logic. Therefore one of challenging tasks for 
Johnson and his followers to fulfil is to provide his theory of argument with a solid philo-
sophical foundation. I hope I can go into detail about this point in another paper. 
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This is an interesting paper that makes a noble attempt to draw from one of the principal 
theorists in rhetorical argumentation and apply some of his insights to a theorist who 
would minimize the role of rhetoric in argumentation to the degree that it is judged insuf-
ficiently rational. Perelman’s treatment of the relationship between the rational and the 
reasonable provides the central theme of the paper, but it is more than a case study of 
Perelman (as the title would suggest), offering also an important critique of Johnson’s 
Informal Logic. The project is successful on several levels but there are points about the 
senses of rationality in both Perelman and Johnson that deserve further attention. 
2. THE SENSES OF ‘RATIONAL’ IN PERELMAN 
At the outset we are confronted with a problem. Ostensibly, Perelman rejects the rational, 
so how can he maintain a dialectic between the rational and the reasonable? Part of the 
problem that we always have with reading Perelman is the way that he constantly breaks 
with tradition and modifies established terms without always being so clear that this is 
what he is doing. He also trades in the kinds of oppositions that we see illustrated by the 
rational/reasonable contrast. The traditional way to read the rational is to tie it to what is 
self-evident and see it elevated in the Cartesian effort to ground science. Thus, the post-
Cartesian concept of reason forces us to be “irrational” whenever we discuss matters of 
uncertainty. But this, of course, is the domain of argumentation, in contrast to demonstra-
tion, and here we deal with what is reasonable rather than rational. This is also the do-
main of the human or personal, because what the Cartesian perspective had favoured was 
a disengagement from the human and human language. The self-evidence founded in the 
divine left no room for rhetoric and dialectic (Perelman, 1982: 159). But argumentation 
with its disputes and fallibility leads us back to the “properly human foundations” of log-
ic and to the personal. Thus, Perelman can claim that “every discourse which does not 
claim an impersonal validity belongs to rhetoric” (p. 162). 
 But another contrast is suggested here: between impersonal and personal validi-
ties,. And it reasonable to ask what would constitute a personal validity, what kinds of 
standards does Perelman have in mind? To explore this, of course, takes us centrally 
through the new rhetoric project. But it helps us again to see the kind of dialectic between 
the rational and the reasonable that Professor Jin has in mind, because for the rational to 
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have purchase it now must be recast in rhetorical terms, losing its former nature. In some 
respects, it still stands in its original form as a backdrop against which other ideas can be 
seen. The notion of the quasi-logical, for example, is made clear because audiences al-
ready have a sense of logical validity drawn from tradition, and it is this sense that is 
simulated (but not adopted) by the quasi-logical. Still, I believe that we cannot fully ap-
preciate how the rational has been recast in the new rhetoric without considering the cen-
tral idea of the universal audience, even though that concept brings with it more vague-
ness. The new “rationality” involves a sense of universality or objectivity (which is char-
acteristic of the reasonable—Jin, p.3), but that comes from the universal audience. Brief-
ly, we can see this as a personalization of the rational insofar as the universal audience 
resides within each particular audience that is addressed in argumentation, present as the 
principle of reason that is operative within those audiences. This allows Perelman to 
avoid the essential relativism that would make the standard of argumentation simply its 
effectiveness with respect to a particular audience, with all that audience’s specific inter-
ests and possible prejudices. Rather, when we consider arguments addressed to us, we are 
able to do so both in terms of our specific interests in an issue and in terms of what we 
appreciate to be reasonable within our community, what counts as standards of ac-
ceptance at this time and in this place. This universal audience is again not the philoso-
phers’ universal audience of the tradition, valid beyond space and time. Rhetoric brings 
these considerations into the concrete moments of the personal, where we connect with 
standards that do not depend on us but with which we interact and which change over 
time. Through this, the rational has been largely recast as an aspect of the reasonable, 
since it is in the appropriate agreement of the valid and the effective that the reasonable in 
argumentation is seen. 
3. ARISTOTLE 
How much does Aristotle’s distinction between scientific (theoretical) reason and practical 
reason illuminate Perelman’s dialectic between the rational and the reasonable? Despite 
Perelman’s roots in Aristotle, he seems not to be interested in that particular tension but 
rather is working within the practical, since this is the domain of argumentation. Aristotle’s 
scientific reason does not give itself to argumentation in the ways that Perelman expects. 
Moreover, Aristotle himself sees the universal and the particular operating in both the sci-
entific and the practical. In the practical, for example, it may account for the problem of the 
akrasic who does not do what he knows to be in his best interest. How is this possible? 
Clearly, two senses of knowing are implicated here, and the akrasic is only in command of 
one of them. He knows the universal but fails to apply it to his own particular situation. 
4. THE SENSE OF ‘RATIONAL’ IN JOHNSON 
It’s to be agreed that there are multiple senses of “rational” at work in Johnson. And he 
certainly is less interested in the juridical argumentation that attracted Perelman and  
Habermas, since Johnson believes that personal responsibility is not stressed in the legal 
situation (2000: 26). Sometimes Johnson’s use of different senses of rational seems delib-
erate insofar as rationality characterizes argumentation and is the goal at which it aims. 
But he does settle on a central sense, and this is a very different type of rationality than 
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what we have seen in Perelman. This is not the self-evidence of the demonstrable, but it 
is an intersubjective idea that bears on the ethics of argumentation. This is the sense of 
rational that Professor Jin judges to be insufficiently developed in Johnson, and I think he 
is right. It is not enough for argumentation to be based on the giving and receiving of 
reasons (a core sense of rational for Johnson); it must also see the “arguer’s log-
os…influenced by the logos of the Other” (p. 12), and this involves judging the attitude 
of the arguer to the intervention of the Other. To be rational (or manifestly rational) has to 
do with how we treat other arguers, what we do in argumentation that recognizes the full 
cognitive nature of the other. So to be rational is to avoid exploitation, which is why John-
son relegates rhetorical features like ethos and pathos to having secondary importance. This 
is where Johnson attributes a sense of the rational to the rhetorical that Jin finds perplexing. 
From the point of view of rhetoric, claims Johnson, the arguer may ignore objections “if 
doing so is rational” (Johnson 2000: 163). But this is because he believes that for an argu-
ment to be “effectively rational,” rhetoric will require it to take account of “the human en-
vironment” and connect it “with human sentiment” (2000: 269). This brings the roles of 
ethos and pathos to the fore, and Johnson does not favour doing so.  
 When Johnson writes that argumentation is located within the domain of the 
rational (2000: 269), it sounds as if he has a fundamental disagreement with Perelman. 
But he allows that the ‘rational’ involved is one that also accommodates rhetoric, insofar 
as rhetoric gives logos a central place. It is simply that this is not the only component to 
give argument rational force. For Johnson, the dialectical tier with its accompanying ob-
ligations is a central component of argument. The rhetor might assume such obligations, 
but does not have to since her arguments can be perfectly effective without them. And 
therein lies the difference, since dealing with obligations is non-negotiable for Johnson. 
 But as I have suggested briefly above, Perelman’s rhetorical standards of good 
argumentation encompass more than just effectiveness, and it is the case that his wider 
(but still vague) notion of the reasonable may indeed require consideration of objections, 
since that is likely to be a demand placed on the arguer by the universal audience. More-
over, there is also a sense in which Perelman does endorse the kind of mutual rationality 
that operates at the heart of Johnson’s project. We see this in what he (and Olbrechts-
Tyteca) have to say about the treatment of audiences. 
 For Perelman, the very fact that someone is worth persuading brings value into the 
situation and attaches importance to the agreements between people (Perelman & Olbrechts-
Tyteca, 1969: 16). The arguer here shows “some concern for the interlocutor” and has to “be 
interested in his state of mind” (ibid.). It is just such a concern that seems crucial to mutual 
rationality, where the arguer and the Other treat each other as operating in a sphere of reason-
ableness, with all the senses of obligation and commitment appropriate to such a sphere.  
 This could be stronger in Johnson, and it is a strength of Jin treatment that he 
draws our attention to this and stresses the nature of the importance involved. The split at 
the heart of an argument for Johnson, with its illative core and dialectical tier threatens to 
remain unhealed (Tindale 2002). Focusing on reasons as the core of rationality separates 
logic from is human origins. Hence, the need for a bridge to connect the illative and the 
dialectical. Johnson needs the connections with the “human environment” (the “personal” 
of Perelman’s reasonableness) that he worries are over-stressed in the rhetorical. But I 
believe the full commitment to the mutuality of mutual rationality already assumes that 
connection. It is there; it just needs fuller articulation. 
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